

BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

AFSARC 1A FOR ASAT PROGRAM

PURPOSE: To provide information for Major General Brown's use prior to the AFSARC 1 meeting on 16 May 80.

BACKGROUND:

- ADCOM RDC 10-74, Space Defense System, was validated for system development in May 1975. From then until 1978, the Air Force was developing ASAT technology. (ADC submitted a SOI for all Space Defense elements in Nov 79 which has not yet been validated.)
- The 20 Jan 78 SECDEF memo on ASAT policy supported the President's preferred approach of negotiating a verifiable ban with the Soviets, but also directed a vigorous ASAT development program.
- DUSD/Policy was charged with providing the operational requirements. This is being done through the Adm Murphy study.
- USORCE was directed to implement a balanced and comprehensive ASAT program, organized and budgeted to achieve a full operational capability.
- The 1 May 1978 JCS memorandum specified an interim ASAT requirement.

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- The AF Council on 21 Feb reviewed the ASAT effort, and deliberated on two key issues.
- Should the program be structured to field a "normal" weapon system (technical orders, training equipment, reliability/maintainability standards, etc.) or something less (contractor maintained, very limited training and support equipment, waiver of some military standards)?
- Is a slip in IOC from FY85 to FY87 acceptable? This slip is necessary to keep within available FY80 and 81 funds.

- The AF Council decided the following:

- Field a heavily contractor dependent system ("Stink works")
- Let program slip to 1983 for first flight test and 1987 IOC.
- Increase test program to 13 live fire events and reduce Limited Operational Capability (LOC) to two weapons.

DISCUSSION:

Although ADC had approved the "Stink works" deployment envelope and the slip in IOC to 1987, both issues were lost because of cost considerations.

- Noting the 86 IOC would have required an added \$112 million spread over FY 80-82.

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The AF Staff is currently staffing a RND change to implement the above AF Council actions. ADC concerns with the draft RND are:

- Life cycle cost study needs to be performed to confirm that contractor maintenance and flight line operations are least cost approach.

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The attached charts and script show the AFMARC briefing as it was presented to MC Moore and some of the ADC DCEs on 23 April.

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- The data presented on SPARC and SPARCS improvements is for information only. No decisions are being requested in these areas.

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- Countermeasure work generally consistent with our view of threat. In flight update of intercept point will improve AGAT ~~performance against non-maneuvring~~.
- Two program alternatives are shown to move IOC back to 1985.

Alternative II requires considerable ~~concurrency~~ <sup>concurrency</sup> between testing and production phases.

Alternative III requires a substantial compression of the development and testing phases.

We have recently heard that Dr. Kopf (Dr. Herman's deputy) will push for a redefinition of IOC.

Current definition is 7 a/c and 16 operational missiles which was to have been half of total assets in SPO's earlier definition of force mix.

Suggest that any other definition of IOC (which may be driven by political considerations) be based on a meaningful increment of military utility.

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#### CONCLUSION:

The Air Force Council decisions of 21 Feb have set the course for this program.

- Full contractor maintenance and flight line operation.
- No technical orders (except pilot data) or AFIC involvement.
- Support equipment not designed to enter AF inventory.
- Maximum latitude given to SPO in development actions.

The IOC slip from 1985 to 1987 is primarily a consequence of the reluctance to fund the Prototype Missiles Air Launch Vehicle (PALV) adequately in the FY 80-82 time period.

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#### RECOMMENDATION:

- Indicate concern that contractor maintenance may not be least cost approach. (AFIC shares this concern)
- Will require redundant contractor personnel to perform flight line functions.

-- Suggest that a full life cycle cost analysis (with ADC and YAC participation) be performed before the Air Force settles on "shank works" approach.

On subject of IOC date, support any effort to accelerate.

-- Threat exists now (particularly for Navy).

-- Compromise (such as 1986 IOC) may be possible with acceptable risk.

-- Redefining IOC should be based on an instrument which has significant military value.

Although force structure decisions are not made until AFMARC/AFPMARC III, you should note that number of missiles (SI) is probably underestimated.

-- 60 to 80 required for full JCS target list (48 targets) plus spares.

-- Two per year expended for live fire testing.

ACTION OFFICER: Asst Verduyn/AFPM/3054 DATE: 14 MAY 1980

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ATTACHMENT: AFPMARC WILLIAM R. KENTY, Colonel, USAF  
Asst DCS/Plans Policy, Programs  
and Requirements